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Not every advisory should become a detection rule. Start by asking what the exploit leaves behind, which systems are exposed and whether your logs can prove it.
A useful detection triage starts with the event trail, not the CVSS score. Read the advisory and name the observable action: request path, API call, process, identity change, file write or outbound connection.
If the advisory only says 'remote code execution' and gives no exploit shape, treat detection as uncertain. Patch and exposure reduction can move immediately while the SOC waits for better telemetry detail.
Exposure answers whether the affected product is present and reachable. Detection answers whether exploitation or follow-on behaviour would appear in logs. Both matter, but they drive different work.
An internet-facing gateway with weak logs may be a patch priority and a detection gap at the same time. A well-logged internal service may be a good hunting candidate even if the exposure is narrower.
A short triage note is enough. It should say whether to write a rule, hunt manually, wait for more detail or decline detection work. The note should also record why, so the same CVE is not re-litigated next week.
CloudSigma belongs in the rule lane when the advisory gives specific behaviour. DCV belongs in the coverage lane when the team needs to show whether the required evidence exists.
cve_id: CVE-2026-42823
affected_surface: Azure Logic Apps control plane
observable_event: Azure Activity Log role-assignment change
exposure_state: production tenants reviewed
detection_decision: write Sigma rule
reason: specific API behaviour is visible
A weak rule is worse than no rule when it teaches the SOC to trust noise. If the only available match is a CVE id in a scanner result or a vendor name in a banner, call it vulnerability management evidence, not exploit detection.
That honesty keeps the detection backlog clean. It also leaves room to add a rule later if exploit details, public IoCs or incident data become specific enough.